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TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
FUTURE: CONTINUING THE DISCUSSION*
TERESA STANTON COLLETT t

Law school applications are declining.1 Funding for legal education seems to be a low priority for state legislators and donors,
who are susceptible to the widespread perception that lawyers'
contribution to the common good is far outweighed by the transaction costs that attorneys create.2 Legal scholarship is reviled
as irrelevant or pernicious.' The teaching in law schools often is
seen as little better.4 As members of "the elite" of the profession,
we are accused, at best, of having lost touch with the concerns of
everyday lawyers,5 and at worst of having betrayed our profession.' It is against this backdrop that Professors Tom Morgan,

* In this Essay, Professor Collett summarizes the 1997 W.M. Keck Foundation
Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics proceedings of the Panel on Progress. The
panel convened on March -22, 1997, to discuss where the professional responsibility
teaching field stands now, and in what direction it might move. Panel members
included Thomas B. Metzloff, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law;
Thomas D. Morgan, Oppenheim Professor of Antitrust & Trade Regulation Law,
George Washington University National Law Center, and Deborah L. Rhode, Ernest
F. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the
Legal Profession, Stanford University. The panel was moderated by John M. Levy,
Professor of Law, Director of Clinical Education & Summer Law Programs Abroad,
College of William & Mary School of Law. All remarks attributed to these participants were made during the panel discussion unless otherwise indicated.
t Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Plus They'll Get Lots More Sleep, SETTLE TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1997, at
C1, available in 1997 WL 3247605.
2. See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff et al., Preparing the New Law Graduate to Practice
Law: A View from the Trenches, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 403 n.80 (1997) (noting
budget difficulties confronting most law schools); Paul M. Barrett, New York Firms
Called Pricey, Arrogant, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B8.
3. See Uphoff et al., supra note 2, at 387.
4. See TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR ASSIN,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM

4-6 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; Uphoff et al., supra note 2, at 381-82.
5. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 222 (1994).
6. See id. at 225-26.
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Tom Metzloff, Deborah Rhode, and I were asked to discuss the
future of teaching professional responsibility.
All panelists agreed that changes are in store for professors of
professional responsibility; some are desirable, while others are
inevitable. Some reasons for these changes are obvious. The way
law is practiced and regulated is changing, as is the political
environment in which lawyers operate. Most professors are
acutely aware that our students will be required to respond to a
more diverse professional environment than we have seen in our
lifetimes. Our students and colleagues bring more varied experience, knowledge, and values into law school classrooms. The curriculum and pedagogy of law schools are evolving, albeit slowly,
to meet these changes. This Essay focuses on three areas of
change: practice, students, and curriculum and pedagogy.
I. CHANGES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Practicing law is radically different from the professional experiences of lawyers a generation ago. Local partnerships of
friends, once the norm of law firm practice, have transformed into
business associations of legal services providers.' Megafirms,
often employing more than 600 lawyers, have emerged.8 Branch
offices provide legal services across state and national boundaries Yet, the structural stability of these large firms is questionable; the bar has witnessed one firm after another implode,
leaving lawyers scrambling for new professional homes.' ° Many
lawyers lacking strong skills in attracting clients, but providing
solid legal representation, have suffered dramatic changes in
their life styles, expectations, and law practice."
7. See id. at 20-35; MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE
ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE 1-4 (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER
273-83 (1993); Anthony E. Davis, The Long-Term Implications of the Kaye Scholer

Case for Law Firm Management-Risk Management Comes of Age, 35 S. TEX. L.
REV. 677, 679-81 (1994); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1991).
8. See KRONMAN, supra note 7. at 273-83.

9. See, e.g., Symposium, Ethics and the MultijurisdictionalPractice of Law, 36 S.
TEx. L. REV. 657 (1995).
10. See Todd S. Lundy, Law Firms Experience the Best of Times, the Worst of
Times, TR. & EST., Mar. 1, 1997, at 24, 24-29.
11. See GLENDON, supra note 5, at 20-35.
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Partially reacting against the bureaucratization of the practice
in large firms, and partially responding to the apparent instability
of law firm membership, some lawyers began small specialty, or
boutique firms, providing expert assistance in highly specialized
areas of the law. 2 Such firms now thrive in all major cities.'"
Specialization, possible in the megafirms and boutiques, has
led to an increasing demand for specialized professional associations addressing issues at the depth needed to assist sophisticated practitioners in their day-to-day practice.' 4 Professor Morgan
observed that the growth of these associations led to a struggle
among groups claiming to represent the profession: "I say struggle. I don't mean a war, specifically, but in effect battle for supremacy among organizations like the sections within the ABA
or particular specialized groups of lawyers and the state bars, on
the one hand, versus the American Bar Association on the other
hand." This struggle is evidenced by the differing formulations of
professional standards promulgated by various groups; examples
include the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,5 the Bounds
of Advocacy, 6 and the ACTEC Commentaries on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.'7 Professor Morgan distinguished
12. See Dan Margolies, Free at Last: Restless Middle-Aged Attorneys Flee Bureaucracy of Big Law Firms, KAN. CITY BUS. J., Mar. 14, 1997, at 17, 17.
13. See id.
14. See John Edgar, Smart Clients, Competition Drives Law Firms to Reach New
Plateaus, KAN. CITY BUS. J., Oct. 18, 1996, at 20, 20.
15. AmERICAN LAwYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Found. 1982), reprinted in STEPHEN GmLERS & ROy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 323 (1989). The American Trial Lawyers Association is an organization comprised of experienced trial attorneys devoted to improving the quality of advocacy in American courts. Professor Monroe H. Freedman was
involved actively in the development of the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct. See
Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
685, 685 (1981).
16. BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1992), reprinted in 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1992). The
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers is an organization of approximately 1200
members who represent families in the process of marital dissolution. Professor Robert H. Aronson was the reporter during the development of the ethical standards
contained in the Bounds of Advocacy. See Robert H. Aronson, Introduction: The
Bounds of Advocacy, 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 41, 41 (1992).
17. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC COmmENTARIEs
ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2d ed. 1995). The American College of Trusts and Estate Counsel is an organization comprised of experienced law-
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this struggle from the more widely perceived competition between the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American
Law Institute (ALI), with its recent initiative, the Restatement
(Third)of the Law Governing Lawyers: 8
The Restatement does not purport to control lawyers' conduct
in the same way the Model Rules do. Rather, it purports to
collect rules developed in non-discipline contexts and thus
change the focus from the disciplinary context alone. The
"control" issue is fought between licensing courts and courts
imposing civil liability; the "focus" question is between the
ALI and ABA. This is not a big point, but the ALI does not
want to become the new House of Delegates.
Professor Morgan predicted that the Law Governing Lawyers
focus on multiple systems of controlling lawyers' conduct ultimately would prevail over the more traditional disciplinary focus
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Professor Morgan did not
think that choice of direction would be without resistance. As he
stated, "[tihe American Bar Association has a lot of time, effort,
money and prestige wrapped up in the Model Rules.... [Blut
the reality is that there is going to be a real struggle to break
free of that focus." 9
This struggle for regulatory control of the legal profession
extends beyond professional associations comprised exclusively
of lawyers. In his article Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, Professor Wilkins identifies four possible regulatory systems-some
controlled exclusively by lawyers, others not.2" Traditional disciplinary systems adjunct to the bar have broad jurisdiction over

yers devoting a substantial portion of their practice to the trusts and estates area.
Professor John R. Price was the reporter during the development of the commentaries,
now in their second edition. See id. at 9. Revisions for a third edition are underway.
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Final Draft

No. 1, 1996).
19. The Restatement's relationship to state disciplinary codes is the subject of
extensive academic commentary. See Symposium, The Evolving Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
20. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799,
805-09 (1992).
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conduct defined as unprofessional, but rely upon others for reports of misconduct before investigating.2 Professor Wilkins
argues that this reliance upon others results in uneven enforcement because the majority of complaints are filed by individual,
rather than corporate, clients seeking the bar's assistance in
punishing lawyers whom the clients believe have acted unethically.' Yet many injured clients will not complain because they
do not recognize the source of their injuries. Even in the cases in
which clients understand that the attorney's conduct led to their
loss, compensation for client injuries is outside the jurisdiction of
many disciplinary systems, giving little incentive for reporting
misconduct to the bar."
Civil liability through expanded recognition of malpractice
claims provides clients with greater incentives for pursuing
relief for injuries due to attorney misconduct, but the costs of
litigation make this method of regulating lawyers' conduct unavailing when the injuries have nominal economic value.' Also,
this system generally fails to protect nonclients from injuries
suffered at the hands of unscrupulous lawyersY This later limitation, however, can be removed by eliminating the requirement
that malpractice
plaintiffs show they were in privity with the
26
lawyer.

The third possible system for regulating attorney conduct is
expanding institutional controls such as Rule 112" or the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule 2(e)Y This method ensures closer monitoring of lawyers within the context of institutional representation and has met with success in certain regu-

21. See id. at 822-24.
22. See id. at 822-30.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 830-33.
25. See id. at 833-35.
26. See id.; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Privity Requirement Reconsidered,
37 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 992-94 (1996) (suggesting replacing privity with the standard contained in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958)). But see John H.
Bauman, A Sense of Duty: Regulation of Lawyer Responsibility to Third Parties by
the Tort System, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 995, 1030-31 (1996) (arguing that privity plays
an important role in limiting attorneys' liability to foreseeable harms).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (1997).
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lated industries.29 Yet institutional controls subject lawyers and
their clients to sanctions imposed for strategic reasons independent of the propriety of the lawyers' conduct."0 This increase in
institutional power has substantial costs to our understanding of
zealous advocacy.
Political accountability is the fourth method of controlling
lawyers' conduct identified by Professor Wilkins.3 ' Legislatively-created agencies could assume the responsibilities traditionally borne by bar disciplinary systems, enhanced by a grant of the
independent investigative powers found in many administrative
settings. 2 This approach would be costly and would pose some
danger of capture by the profession, rendering it virtually indistinguishable from the present disciplinary system; yet Professor
Wilkins sees some benefit to this model.33
Of the four systems that Professor Wilkins identifies, only one
is controlled exclusively by lawyers.' This supports Professor
Morgan's conclusion that the ALI will prevail in its current
attempt to define the obligations of lawyers through the Restatement. 5 Consistent with Professor Wilkins' analysis, the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers approach
recognizes that lawyers are regulated in ways beyond the traditional disciplinary system. Civil and criminal liability have
emerged as alternative systems of regulating lawyers' conduct,
as evidenced by the statistics reflecting increasing claims of
attorney malpractice. 6 Federal agencies successfully have im-

29. See Wilkins, supra note 20, at 835-44. See generally In the Matter of Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation,
Lawyers' Ethics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993) (exploring the
implications of the Kaye, Scholer dispute); Symposium, Lawyer and Law Firm Liability to Regulators and Shareholders, 12 REv. LrIG. 513 (1993) (examining the impact
of failed financial institutions' litigation on the law of professional responsibility and
the regulation of lawyers); Symposium, The Attorney-Client Relationship in a Regulated Society, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 571 (1994) (presenting eight views on the role of
the lawyer in regulated society).
30. See Wilkins, supra note 20, at 838.
31. See id. at 844-47.
32. See id. at 844.
33. See id. at 844-47.
34. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
36. See Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Respons-
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posed millions of dollars of fines for attorney misconduct and
have extracted agreements concerning the future management of
cases." State legislatures routinely threaten the independence
of the bar with the creation of an administrative agency to oversee the delivery of legal services. 8 Lawyers, or law professors,
believing the only risk from unethical conduct is discipline by
the state bar, are out of touch with the reality of contemporary
practice.
Finally, in addition to the changing organizational and regulatory structure of the practice of law, the legal profession is
struggling to respond to the technological revolution resulting in
access to massive amounts of information and almost instantaneous worldwide communication. One small example of the
issues our students will face in practice is the application of the
duty of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege to communications transmitted via new technology. Is the privilege waived
if the client and attorney converse via cellular telephones? 9 If
a lawyer communicates over the Internet with a client, must the
message be encrypted to protect the privilege? 0 0 n a m o r e
fundamental level, what is the effect of technology on the quality
of legal advice given to clients who may electronically communicate their request and demand a response by the end of the day?
Can lawyers really issue considered opinions within two hours?
Good judgment depends, at least in part, on adequate time for
deliberation.

es, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1558-59 (1994); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and
Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1995); Manuel R.
Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1657, 1663 (1995).
37. See Monroe H. Freedman, Kaye Scholer-Overzealous or Overblown?, 35 S.
TEX. L. REV. 577, 581 (1994); Carolyn B. Lieberman et al., Profdssional Conduct in
Representing a Regulated Industry: The OTS Experience, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 607, 619
n.56, 629 (1994).
38. See Wilkins, supra note 20, at 844-46.
39. See David Hricik, Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech Communications,
PROF. LAW., Feb. 1997, at 1, 19 (indicating that privilege should be afforded communications via cellular telephones but acknowledging no clear precedent exists on the
issue).
40. See id. at 22-24 (suggesting the prudence of encrypting e-mail communications).
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II. CHANGES IN OUR STUDENTS

Almost as dramatic as the changes in the structure and regulation of legal practice are the changes in the students entering
41
law school classrooms. Known as "Generation X,"
"Twentysomethings,"42 "Thirteeners,"43 or "Slackers,"" these
young adults born between 1960 and 1975 now comprise the
majority of law students. Popular press descriptions of this generation as "lazy, cynical all-but-illiterate whiners,"45 have been
echoed in literature describing current law students.
That sound you hear emanating most often from law schools
these days is not the hum of fevered intellectual activity. It is
the den of collective whining. Whining is a special kind of communication-it is an expression of generalized dissatisfaction,
usually by children who feel trapped by their unfortunate circumstances, but want to make their misery known to others
nevertheless. Such sounds can also be emitted by adults, however-those who are unwilling to analyze and resolve their
underlying sense of frustration. The reluctance of adult whiners to confront their difficulties is usually based in the fact that
if they did, they know, deep down, they would get news they do
not want to hear. Whining is also therefore self-centered and
self-indulgent-it is what you do when you don't get what you
want, as opposed to what you need or deserve.46
Commentators accuse this generation of law students of viewing
legal education from the vantage point of "consumers," rather
than "participants."47
Yet it may be that the sounds that have been interpreted as

41.
21.
42.
43.
since

Bob Filipczak, It's Just a Job: Generation X at Work, TRAINING, Apr. 1994, at
Id. at 22.
Id. Those born between 1960 and 1975 constitute the thirteenth generation
the ratification of the Constitution. See id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Timothy P. Terrell, A Tour of the Whine Country: The Challenge of Extending
the Tenets of Lawyer Professionalism to Law Professors and Law Students, 34
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (1994).
47. See, e.g., id. at 7.
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whining are in fact something very different-a legitimate,
though inarticulate, expression of frustration. These students
challenge us to establish the relevance of what we teach. Although the oldest members of Generation X remember Watergate and helped put Ronald Reagan in the White House, "[tihey
don't remember where they were when President Kennedy was
shot, and references to Woodstock and the Summer of '68 are a
quick way to start them looking for the nearest exit.' Appeals
to long-term success through single-minded commitment to career ring hollow to the generation that
grew up watching their parents work themselves to death,
only to be down-sized and restructured out of their chosen
careers. Moreover, this is the first wave of latchkey kids to
hit the work force, and they resent the amount of time their
parents spent at work. They also watch their Boomer bosses
turn into workaholics, and they don't like what they see. 9
Motivators for prior generations of law students-liberal" appeals to social justice or "conservative" promises of financial success-seemingly fall on deaf ears.
The key to gaining the attention of these students may lie in
recognition of their positive qualities. Studies have shown that
"[wihat they hold dear are family life, local activism, national
parks, penny loafers and mountain bikes."" They are very spiritual, identifying their own needs as:
1. The need to believe that life is meaningful and has a purpose;
2. The need for a sense of community and deeper relationships;

48. Filipczak, supra note 41, at 22. A similar point has been made in the context
of legal education: "In the 1960's the faculties were conservative and the students
were liberal. In the 1980's, the students were conservative and the faculties were
liberal-the professors having spent their formative years as members of the Grateful Dead entourage." James D. Gordon IH, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100
YALE L.J. 1679, 1688-89 (1991).
49. Filipczak, supra note 41, at 24; see also Laura Zinn et al., Move Over,
Boomers: The Busters are Here-And They're Angry, BUS. WK, Dec. 14, 1992, at 74
(including in this group the "first generation of latchkey children, products of dualcareer households, or, in some 50% of cases, of divorced or separated parents").
50. David M. Gross & Sophfronia Scott, Proceeding with Caution, TIME, July 16,

1990, at 56, 57.
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to be appreciated and loved;
to be listened to-to be heard;
to feel that one is growing in faith;
for practical help in developing a mature faith.5

A life in the law can satisfy, at least in part, the first two of
these needs.
I often tell my students of an exchange that occurred in a
small professional responsibility class. We had just engaged in a
role play based upon the facts of Spaulding v. Zimmerman,5 a
case in which defense counsel learns that the plaintiff is suffering from an aortic aneurysm, yet settles the case without disclosing this fact to the plaintiff." The student, acting as defense counsel with knowledge of the plaintiffs aneurysm, called
me, in my role as client, for permission to disclose this condition
to the plaintiff and his lawyer. I refused on the basis that causation was too speculative to justify the increased settlement cost
if the information was revealed. The student indicated her disagreement with my decision, but said she would complete the
settlement negotiations according to my directions. When I
asked if she would keep me as a client after the conclusion of
the matter, she replied, "Sure. Most of what lawyers do is helping people do things that [the lawyers] believe are immoral." "If
that is what lawyers do, then why do you want to spend the rest
of your life being one," I immediately responded. "Isn't your life
more valuable than that?" After a brief pause, the student said
she had never been asked that question, and she would have to
think about it before answering. The entire tenor of the class
changed for the better.
Perhaps we engage our students by convincing them to answer the same question: "Is the practice of law worthy of your life?"'
51. Robert A. Ludwig, Twentysomethings: Struggling to Find a Meaningful Life,
CATHOLIC WORLD, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 196, 202 (citing a 1992 Gallup survey report);
see also God's Own Country, ECONOMIsT, Aug. 19, 1995, at 77, 77 ("Corporate America has begun to take notice, especially as research indicates that members of the
post-baby-boom generation, the so-called Generation x, are more religious than their
parents were at their age.").
52. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
53. See id. at 708.
54. A word of warning may be in order here. If we ask our students to answer
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IL. CHANGES IN CURRICULUM & PEDAGOGY

How have the changes in law practice and students affected
law school curriculum and pedagogy? Professor Morgan stated
the panel's shared conclusion:
First, it may be obvious to us, but I don't think it is self-evident, that there is going to be more focus in law schools on
professionalism and professional responsibility... I don't
think it will happen without resistance, but the Macerate
Report already has had, and it is inevitably going to have, an
impact in the future that even those who want to resist its
conclusions are going to have to come to grips with it. So, I
don't think the question is whether there is going to be movement in this area. It is how much and what directions, and
how can we motivate it to be in the right direction?
Buttressing the MacCrate Report's call for the teaching of the
professional values55 is Teaching and Learning Professionalism,
the recent report of the Professionalism Committee of the ABA
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.56 The
Professionalism Committee joined the members of the MacCrate
Commission in their call for law schools to "[e]levat[e] legal
ethics and professionalism to the same level as the other major
components of the curriculum."57
Yet neither Professor Morgan nor Professor Rhode supported
the idea of incorporating the suggestions of these committees
into accreditation standards. Professor Rhode expressed concern
about the ability to develop sufficient consensus around standards that could be enforced and monitored systematically
across all law schools. Professor Morgan agreed, stating:
I am deeply skeptical that an accreditation process can get
reliable criteria which it could enforce consistently to insure
quality teaching of professional responsibility. Accreditation
that question, then we must be prepared to explain why teaching law students is a
worthwhile way to spend our lives.
55. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 330-34.
56. PROFESSIONALSM COMM., AmIcAN BAR ASSWN, TEACHING AND LEARNiNG PROFESSIONALISM (1996).
57. Id. at 19.
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committees are good at doing certain things. They are good at
getting law schools to spend x amount of dollars, or things you
can measure quantitatively.... [Instead] I think showing people what can be done with limited resources in a whole variety
of different innovative ways.., is the right way to go.58
ProfessionalResponsibility: Ethics by the Pervasive Method "9 is
an example of the second approach. Professor Rhode's collection of
materials to incorporate professional responsibility issues into
every class makes adoption of the pervasive method much more
attractive than any command by accreditation authorities. As
Professor Morgan observed, however, even with materials readily
at hand, uniform use of the pervasive method is unlikely:
I think we ought not view the pervasive method as requiring
universal assent on our faculties. If we demand universal assent, we almost certainly are going to be disappointed.... In
the regulated industries we call this the last 10% problem. That
is, it is often true that if you have a problem, you can solve 90%
of it with relatively little investment and struggle. When you
try to solve the last 10% is when you have the most cost and the
most resistance. I am not meaning to say that we ought to acquiesce in less than our best. I am simply saying that the pervasive method, in my judgment, ought to be seen as a direction
rather than an outcome that is defined by universal acceptance.
In furtherance of that direction, Professor Rhode observed that
her upcoming term as president of the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) provided some opportunity to support efforts
to engage all law professors in discussions about teaching professional responsibility in their courses. She asked for assistance in
updating the Annotated Bibliographyof EducationalMaterialson
Legal Ethics:6

58. For a call to seriously consider the use of such institutional power, see John

M. Levy, Comment on Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, by Roger C. Cramton and Susan P. Koniak, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 207
(1996).
59. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTy: ETHIcs BY THE PERVASIVE

METHOD (1994).
60. Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Educational Materials on Legal
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I urge you to send me new items that either you have done or
that you know of that seem to work well in the class. I wrote
down a number of ideas that people have at this conference,
but I think one of the things that we can usefully do when we
are together is share what we do in our classrooms.
Teaching professional responsibility has matured. People who
have taken innovative approaches now feel that those approaches have at least produced enough evidence that they can discuss
their experiences. They talk about what they have tried, how it
worked, what problems remain with the approach, and what
successes recur every time. Although these discussions are not
empirical studies, they are the beginning attempts to determine
the best methodologies to achieve particular objectives in teaching professional responsibility.
Yet clear definition of those objectives seems illusive. Debate
still rages between advocates of the moral philosophy, law of
lawyering, and practical judgment approaches. 6 Many of us
want to embrace all three, yet in the two-to-three credit hours
allotted in most law schools doing one well is difficult enough.
The changing nature of practice makes the challenge even
greater. The skills young lawyers need to make it alone or in
small firms differ from those needed by an "organizational man,"
the ideal employee of the megafirm. s Should every student be
introduced to principles of law office management and required
to understand the difference between cash flow reports and
profit and loss statements? Should the curriculum be designed to
encourage the development of skills necessary to serve individual clients, those most likely to seek the services of a newly-admitted solo practitioner? Or should students be encouraged to
begin specialization by studying particular bodies of law in great
depth? Must students emerge from law school capable of self-

Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 361.

61. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 169-89 (1996).

62. See generally Margolies, supra-note 12, at 17 (discussing big firm expatriates'
disenchantment with "bureaucratic imperatives" and emphasizing solo practitioners'
degree of control).
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sufficiency, or should they be poised for integration within a
large organization? The answers to all of these questions lie within the context of a particular school with a particular faculty and
student body. Professor Metzloff illustrated the task that lies
before us in attempting to answer these questions with his closing
hypothetical fact pattern.
IV. WHAT Is OUR RESPONSE?

Let's use our imaginations that we are in a special session of our
curriculum committee, a very rare session on a Saturday. We are
dealing with what do with our ethics curriculum and we have a
presentation being made by our ethics professor, Professor Polly
Professional. Polly is short for Pollyanna, I think. She just attended this conference at William and Mary and others like it last year,
and she has concluded that what we really need is to upgrade our
program significantly.
She recommended a mandatory two-hour course taught in small
sections of no more than forty people. This would require at least
three or four members of the faculty teaching these sections. A
mandatory additional credit of ethics would be taken anytime
thereafter prior to graduation. Hopefully the law school would
have four or five such courses being offered regularly, or another
advanced course that would have "special emphasis on ethical issues." Examples of the advanced course included the course Polly
teaches in professional liability that deals with both medical and
legal malpractice, courses in dispute resolution that often deal
quite extensively with ethical issues, or the new course that she
just taught this fall on mass torts with a look at the Dalkon Shield
cases and A Civil Action by Jonathan Harr.63 The students in this
new course looked at ethical, procedural, and product liability
issues.
Also, she advocated an aspirational voluntary use of the pervasive method throughout the school, encouraging the dean's office
to provide stipends to faculty to attend ethical seminars and programs in their own fields. Your curriculum committee at your
hypothetical law school could come up with something else. The
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point is to do more than you are doing, whatever it may be, and do
it in a creative way.
Let's anticipate some of the dialogue that we will hear:
Professor Uni Versitatas: There is a lot of ethics going on in the
university. There is a new ethics program within the main part
of the university. Why don't we capture that a little bit? Why
don't we get some of the folks from philosophy and sociology
and create networks and faculty lunch meetings? Let's really
make this into an interdisciplinary approach. Let's not reinvent
the wheel here at the law school but create the networking. We
have been too narrow in thinking about legal ethics. You teach
rules, not really ethics.
Professor Ted Nology: What about technology? We really
should do more about that. What we should do is get some of
these people who are well-known in this field and get them on
the Internet. We could hold three or four conferences every year
at the law school. Maybe we could sell videotapes of these conferences and kind of branch out that way. You are trying to
create a kind of architecture that is too complicated. Let's get
on the Internet and make something happen.
Professor Ain't Broke: It seems to me your present efforts are
good enough. I am delighted that you have these conferences
and so much work is going on. I wish the field I taught was so
dynamic. It's not, but more power to you. Go out and be fruitful
and multiply, but don't add any hours. Revisit your class, remake it, that's great. Use the videotapes that Steve Gillers and
some of these other folks have made. That's fine, we don't mind
it, but your primary job is to make sure that you cover the rules
in enough details so that the students don't complain about the
MPRE. The fact that you've got an exciting, dynamic field doesn't mean you get more hours. We are cutting hours in curriculum. So, good idea. I'm excited for you, but go do it yourself.
Professor Edward Erudite (He always speaks last, and has
contempt for the profession he never practiced and never intended to. He never took the bar because it is beneath him. His
approach is quite academic, quite widespread, and sometimes
hard to follow.): Why are we doing this? Why are we giving in to
the bar in dictating curriculum? (He would then cite the example from Georgia and begin speaking of academic freedom in
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eloquent terms.) If we go down this road of giving in to the
profession about what we teach, then the consequences are
very severe. It is not what we should be doing at all, and if anything, the mistake was made in 1975 when we let the ABA, just
because of this Richard Nixon issue, get us on this road. We
should be deciding what we want to teach, how we want to
teach it, and when we want to teach it. The dangers are all out
there. North Carolina's bar is talking about mandatory
mentoring, where our students are going to have to team up
with an actual lawyer for a semester to travel around with
them, trying to reinvigorate the old days.
Dean Gerry ("show me the money") McGuire has been listening
to this and likes what she's heard, but also said things are
tight: We don't know who's going to teach this; we only have
you, Professor Professional. We could bring in a lot of adjuncts
to teach this, but I am troubled by your suggestion, because it
looks to me like we are going to need seven or eight people.
Where is the money going to come from? We only have a couple
of faculty members who are going to do this regularly. Keck's
not in this game any more. There used to be some sources of
money, but not now.
Professor Professional: What about this new campaign? Aren't
we about to launch a campaign to raise a lot of money? Can't we
make it a priority? Can't we get a chair for professionalism and
ethics?
Dean McGuire: Well, maybe. Is there such a thing as international ethics or interdisciplinary ethics or the law of ethics and
economics? (She is trying to kill two birds with one stone.).
Professor Metzloff ended his dialogue, concluding that our success in answering one question will determine the end of this, and
similar, plays: How do we make ethics matter?"

64. Professor Metzloff concluded his remarks with specific suggestions:
We could revisit the Rule 11 debate. We could get judges back into the
breach when dealing with lawyer ethics. We could turn up the malpractice heat. I am not troubled at all by Ron Mallen's suggestion [that our
students will be subject to malpractice claims in their careers].... We
could make discipline meaningful. We could change the MPRE to make it
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V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps that question is the best possible conclusion for an
essay continuing a panel discussion. But I can't resist closing with
one of Professor Metzloff's conclusions: "Until it really matters in
the profession, it really won't matter to the law schools. Second
proposition. Until it really matters in the law schools, it won't
matter in the profession." I think he is right, and we are at the
beginning of a period when it matters to the profession, beyond
doing penance for corrupt lawyers doing the illegal bidding of the
President of the United States. Those who have taught in this area
since Watergate were the pioneers, but those who join us today
join the vanguard. These are exciting times.

count. We can fight to revise some specific model rules and make those
real rules. Let's revisit some of the events that happened in the eighties.
We can reform some structural issues within the profession dealing with
contingency fees, and some other things that we all identify with. Law
schools could have symposiums on ethics. We can create an aspirational
goal that every law school will have one faculty person who is committed
to the area of professionalism and ethics as their primary area of interest.

